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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS 
EASTERN DIVISION
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY )
COMMISSION, )
) Case No. 07 C 5457
Plaintiff, )
) Judge Virginia M. Kendall
EFRAIN ORTEGA, )
)
Plaintiff-Intervenor )
)
v. )
)
CAST PRODUCTS, INC., )
)
Defendant. )
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff the United States Equal Opportunity Employment Commission (“EEOC”) filed suit 
against Defendant Cast Products, Inc. (“Cast”) claiming that Cast discriminated against Plaintiff- 
Intervenor Efrain Ortega (“Ortega”) on the basis of his disability in violation of Title I of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. Specifically, the 
EEOC claims that Cast failed to provide reasonable accommodations for Ortega’s diabetes and that 
Cast terminated Ortega because of his diabetes. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, Cast has moved for 
summary judgment. For the reasons stated, Cast’s Motion for Summary Judgment is granted in part 
and denied in part. With respect to the claim for failure to accommodate, the motion is denied. With 
respect to the claim for discriminatory termination, the motion is granted.
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STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS
Cast employed Ortega as a die cast machine operator beginning in 1988, where he used a die 
cast machine to fabricate various parts. (Pl. 56.1 Resp. ^ 1; Def. 56.1 Resp. ^ 6.)1 To perform his 
job, Ortega would place a piece of metal into the die cast machine, allow the machine to shape the 
metal into a part, and then remove the finished product from the machine. (Pl. 56.1 Resp. ^ 13.) 
Ortega held that job until Cast terminated his employment on March 8, 2006. (Pl. 56.1 Resp. ^  1, 
3.) On July 21, 2003, Ortega learned that he had diabetes. (Pl. 56.1 Resp. ^ 7.) At that time, his 
doctor sent a note to Cast which indicated that Ortega may require accommodations for his diabetes. 
(Pl. 56.1 Resp. ^ 9.) Starting in the winter months of 2004, as a result of his diabetes, Ortega had 
to urinate frequently— as frequently as once every fifteen minutes. (Def. 56.1 Resp. ^  9, 10; Pl. 
56.1 Resp. ^ 11.)2 Depending on the level of his blood sugar, as little as two or three minutes would 
pass from the time that Ortega first felt the urge to urinate and the time that he actually had to relieve 
himself to avoid involuntary urination. (Def. 56.1 Resp. ^ 11.) On January 12, 2005, Ortega gave 
Cathy Haener (“Haener”), the head of Cast’s Human Resources Department, a note from his doctor 
indicating that Ortega could not work overtime hours. (Pl. 56.1 Resp. ^  4, 10.) Cast honored the
1 Citations to “Plaintiffs’ Response to Defendant’s Statement of Undisputed Facts” have been abbreviated
to “Pl. 56.1 Resp. ^ _.” Likewise, citations to “Defendant’s Response to Plaintiffs’ Rule 56.1 Statement of
Additional Facts” have been abbreviated to “Def. 56.1 Resp. ^ __.”
2
In its Response to Plaintiffs’ Rule 56.1 Statement of Additional Facts, instead of admitting or denying 
certain statements of fact, Cast responded, “Cast neither admits, nor denies, as Cast was not aware of this at any time 
before termination . . . .” without citation to the record. Under the Local Rules of this District, “[a]ll material facts 
set forth in the statement [of additional facts] will be deemed admitted unless controverted by the statement of the 
moving party.” L.R. 56.1(a). In order to controvert the statement of additional facts, the moving party must include 
“a response to each numbered paragraph in the moving party’s statement, including, in the case of any disagreement, 
specific references to . . . the record.” L.R. 56.1(b)(3)(B). The Seventh Circuit has “repeatedly held that a district 
court is entitled to expect strict compliance with Rule 56.1.” Ammons v. Aramark Uniform Servs., Inc., 368 F.3d 
809, 817 (7th Cir. 2004) (citing Bordelon v. Chicago Sch. Reform Bd. o f Trs, 233 F.3d 524, 527 (7th Cir. 2000)). 
Accordingly, the Court deems the following paragraphs of Plaintiffs’ Rule 56.1 Statement of Additional Facts 
admitted: 9, 10, 11, 12, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31 and 32.
2
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doctor’s request and did not require Ortega to work overtime hours after it received the note. (Pl. 
56.1 Resp. U 59.) The note did not refer to diabetes or frequent urination. (Pl. 56.1 Resp. U 10.)
As a result of his diabetes, Ortega had to get up approximately four or fives times each night 
to urinate. (Def. 56.1 Resp. U 28.) When driving his car, if  Ortega felt the need to urinate, he would 
pull over to the side of the road and urinate into a cup that he would empty when he returned home. 
(Def. 56.1 Resp. U 29.) Because of his frequent urination, Ortega would not drive more than thirty 
minutes at a time or take public transportation. (Id.; Def. 56.1 Resp. U 30.) The frequent urination 
also prevented Ortega from serving on a jury, attending concerts and attending his daughter’s school 
activities. (Def. 56.1 Resp. U 32.)
After developing the symptom of frequent urination, Ortega involuntarily urinated on himself 
while he was at work on two separate occasions. (Def. 56.1 Resp. U 12.) To avoid embarrassment, 
he brought a cup to work so he could relieve himself near his work station in case he could not make 
it to the restroom before urinating involuntarily. (Id.) For approximately one year, Ortega emptied 
the urine from his cup into a drain on the factory floor about four or five times each day. (Pl. 56.1 
Resp. U 26; Def. 56.1 Resp. U 18.) He never considered wearing a protective undergarment or “adult 
diaper” while he was at work. (Pl. 56.1 Resp. U 16.) During this time, no supervisor at Cast required 
Ortega to ask for permission prior to using the restroom or told him that he could not leave his work 
station to use the restroom. (Pl. 56.1 Resp. U 37.) Before his termination on March 8, 2006, Ortega 
had not spoken with Haener about his frequent urination or asked her for an accommodation, such 
as relocation to a work station closer to a restroom. (Pl. 56.1 Resp. UU 18, 32, 34.) Nonetheless, 
before his termination, no one at Cast expressed dissatisfaction with Ortega’s level of productivity. 
(Pl. 56.1 Resp. U 37.)
3
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On March 8, 2006, Jose Ortiz (“Ortiz”), Ortega’s supervisor, noticed Ortega supporting 
himself with his left arm against his die cast machine, looking around the surrounding factory area. 
(Pl. 56.1 Resp. ^  6, 28.) Ortiz then saw Ortega expose his penis and urinate near his work station. 
(Id.) After observing Ortega urinate, Ortiz reported the incident to Haener. (Pl. 56.1 Resp. ^ 31.) 
Haener then informed Operations Manager Jeff Adams (“Adams”) of the allegations against Ortega. 
(Def. 56.1 Resp. ^ 35.) Haener and Adams determined that Ortega should be fired if he actually 
urinated while on the factory floor. (Id.; Haener Dep. at 101:9-15.) Later that day, Haener held a 
meeting with Ortiz and Ortega to discuss the incident. (Pl. 56.1 Resp. ^ 34.) At the meeting, Haener 
informed Ortega of the allegations against him. (Def. 56.1 Resp. ^ 34.) Without informing Haener 
that diabetes caused him to urinate with great frequency and urgency, Ortega admitted that he 
urinated while he was on the factory floor, but he claimed that he urinated into a cup, not into the 
scrap metal bin. (Id.) Haener then terminated Ortega’s employment for public urination and 
property damage to Cast’s plant, telling him that “pulling out your penis and urinating in the middle 
of a plant is unconscionable and unreasonable.” (Id.; Pl. 56.1 Resp. ^ 31; Haener Dep. at 65:13-18.) 
The next day, March 9, 2006, Haener learned for the first time that diabetes caused Ortega to urinate 
frequently. (Pl. 56.1 Resp. ^  19, 35.)
Subsequently, Ortega found a job as a machine operator for Frank’s Welding on March 15, 
2007. (Pl. 56.1 Resp. ^ 24.) On September 27, 2007, the EEOC filed suit against Cast alleging 
failure to accommodate and discriminatory termination. (Compl. ^  9, 12.)
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is proper when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if  any, show that there is no genuine issue as to
4
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any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 56(c). In determining whether a genuine issue of fact exists, the Court must view the evidence 
and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the party opposing the motion. Bennington v. 
Caterpillar Inc., 275 F.3d 654, 658 (7th Cir. 2001); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 
U.S. 242, 255 (1986). However, the Court will “limit its analysis of the facts on summary judgment 
to evidence that is properly identified and supported in the parties’ [Local Rule 56.1] statement.” 
Bordelon v. Chicago Sch. Reform Bd. o f Trustees, 233 F.3d 524, 529 (7th Cir. 2000). Where a 
proposed statement of fact is supported by the record and not adequately rebutted, the court will 
accept that statement as true for purposes of summary judgment. An adequate rebuttal requires a 
citation to specific support in the record; an unsubstantiated denial is not adequate. See Albiero v. 
City o f Kankakee, 246 F.3d 927, 933 (7th Cir. 2001); Drake v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 134 
F.3d 878, 887 (7th Cir. 1998) (“‘Rule 56 demands something more specific than the bald assertion 
of the general truth of a particular matter[;] rather it requires affidavits that cite specific concrete 
facts establishing the existence of the truth of the matter asserted.’”).
DISCUSSION
The ADA prohibits discrimination in the terms, conditions and privileges of employment 
against “a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual.” See 
42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). A court must begin its analysis of ADA claims by assessing whether the 
plaintiff is disabled within the meaning of the ADA. See Burnett v. LFW, Inc., 472 F.3d 471, 483 
(7th Cir. 2006). A person has a disability under the ADA when a physical impairment substantially
5
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limits at least one of the person’s major life activities. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A).3 Diabetes is 
a recognized impairment under the ADA. See Branham v. Snow, 392 F.3d 896, 902 (7th Cir. 2004). 
Whether an impairment gives rise to a disability under the ADA is a fact-specific inquiry that 
requires the Court to assess the effect that the impairment has on an individual’s major life activity; 
therefore, diagnosis of an impairment alone is not sufficient to establish the existence of a disability 
within the meaning of the ADA. See Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 198 
(2002).
Ortega claims that diabetes affects his major life activity of waste elimination. While the 
Seventh Circuit has not addressed whether eliminating bodily waste is a major life activity, other 
courts have recognized that waste elimination is a major life activity under the ADA. See, e.g., 
Heiko v. Columbo Savings Bank, 434 F.3d 249, 255 (4th Cir. 2006) (“[E]very circuit court to address 
the issue has concluded that waste elimination is a major life activity.”); Fiscus v. Wal-Mart Stores, 
Inc., 385 F.3d 378, 384 (3d Cir. 2004); Workman v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 165 F.3d 460, 467 (6th Cir. 
1999); Erjavac v. Holy Family Health Plus, 13 F.Supp.2d 737, 747-48 (N.D. 1ll. 1998) (Castillo, J.) 
(“Eating and waste elimination are both essential to remaining alive.”). The parties do not dispute 
that waste elimination constitutes a major life activity under the ADA. Therefore, Ortega is an 
“individual with a disability” if diabetes substantially limits his major life activity of eliminating 
waste.
3
The Court notes that effective January 1, 2009, Congress amended the definition of “disability” under the 
ADA. See The Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act of 2008 (“ADAAA”), Pub.L. No. 110-325, 122 
Stat. 3553 (2008). Although the ADAAA is now effective, courts “use the laws and interpretations that were in 
force when the complained-of acts occurred.” Kiesewetter v. Caterpillar Inc., 295 Fed.Appx. 850, 851 (7th Cir. 
2008) (applying pre-ADAAA definition of “disability”) (citing Landgrafv. USIFilm Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (1994)). 
Therefore, in analyzing whether Ortega qualifies as an individual with a disability, the Court will apply the pre- 
ADAAA definition of “disability.”
6
Case: 1:07-cv-05457 Document #: 45 Filed: 03/09/09 Page 7 of 17 PagelD  #:<pageID>
The impairment does not need to cause an utter inability to perform a major life activity in 
order to constitute a “substantial limitation” under the ADA. See Branham, 392 F.3d at 902 (quoting 
Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 641 (1998)). An individual’s ability to perform a major life 
activity is substantially limited if the individual is unable to perform the activity or is significantly 
restricted as to the condition, manner or duration under which he can perform it, as compared to an 
average person in the general population. See Squibb v. Memorial Med. Ctr., 497 F.3d 775, 781 (7th 
Cir. 2007) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)). To determine whether an impairment substantially 
limits an individual’s ability to perform a major life activity, courts consider the nature and severity 
of the impairment, the actual or expected duration of the impairment and the anticipated permanent 
or long-term impact of the impairment. See Davidson v. Middlefort Clinic, Ltd., 133 F.3d 499, 506 
n.3 (7th Cir. 1998). Other courts have found that individuals could be substantially limited in the 
major life activity of waste elimination when their impairment causes the frequent and urgent need 
to eliminate waste. See, e.g., Workman, 165 F.3d at 467 (employee’s spastic colon could have 
substantially limited major life activity of waste elimination when employee needed to use restroom 
immediately whenever she felt the urge); Wirtz v. FordMotor Co.,No. 05-40324, 2008 WL 565260, 
at *2, *4 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 28, 2008) (Gadola, J.) (employee’s irritable bowel syndrome and 
muscoskeletal spasms could have substantially limited her ability to eliminate waste because the 
condition required her to have restroom access “frequently and without delay”); Erjavac, 13 
F.Supp.2d at 747 (employee’s diabetes could have substantially limited major life activity of waste 
elimination because “the average adult does not need such frequent access to the bathroom that they 
soil themselves while waiting to use it . . . .”). The Court agrees that the frequent and urgent need
7
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to urinate could substantially limit an individual’s performance of the major life activity of waste 
elimination.
With respect to the nature and severity of Ortega’s impairment, the record shows that 
diabetes caused Ortega to urinate frequently. Depending on his blood sugar levels, he would need 
to urinate every fifteen minutes. On several occasions, Ortega involuntarily urinated on himself 
when he could not make it to the restroom in time to eliminate waste in the same manner as an 
average person in the general population does-by using the restroom. Because such a short time 
would pass after he first felt the urge to urinate and the point where he would involuntarily urinate 
on himself if  he did not reach a restroom, Ortega avoided activities that required him to be without 
easy access to restrooms, such as driving for longer than thirty minutes, serving jury duty, attending 
his daughter’s school functions and riding public transportation. Based on that evidence, a 
reasonable jury could conclude that Ortega must eliminate waste with more frequency and urgency 
than a person within the general population. Additionally, diabetes is a chronic disease that does 
not have a cure. Therefore, the expected duration of Ortega’s impairment is the remainder of his 
life.
Although Cast concedes that Ortega’s diabetes requires him to frequently urinate, Cast 
claims that Ortega cannot be substantially limited in the major life activity of waste elimination 
because he does not have difficulty actually removing bodily waste. To support this contention, Cast 
points to situations where a person’s inability to eliminate bodily waste gave rise to a finding that 
the person was substantially limited in the major life activity of waste elimination. See Heiko, 434 
F.3d at 257 (plaintiff required dialysis to eliminate toxins from blood); Fiscus, 385 F.3d at 383-85 
(plaintiff’ s kidney failure required her to undergo dialysis to eliminate bodily waste). While the
8
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plaintiffs in those cases experienced substantial limitations on their ability to eliminate waste 
because their bodies were not capable of eliminating waste on their own, those are not the only 
possible situations where a person could suffer a substantial limitation in the major life activity of 
waste elimination. The ADA does not require an inability to perform a major life activity before an 
individual meets the statutory definition of “disabled.” See Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 641 (The ADA 
“addresses substantial limitations on major life activities, not utter inabilities.”); Squibb, 497 F.3d 
at 781 (“[A]n individual is substantially limited in [a major life activity] if  she is unable to perform 
such an activity or is significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration under which she 
can perform it as compared to an average person in the general population.”) (emphasis added). 
Ortega has put forth evidence that would permit a reasonable jury to conclude that his frequent and 
urgent need to urinate significantly restricts the manner or condition in which he can perform the 
major life activity of waste elimination because he requires more frequent and immediate access to 
a restroom than an average person in the general population.
Cast contends that urinary incontinence cannot give rise to a disability under the ADA. To 
support its argument, Cast relies on Gratzl v. Chief Judges o f the 12th, 18th, 19th and22nd Judicial 
Circuits, No. 07 C 0867, 2008 WL 2840566 (N.D. Ill. July 22, 2008) (St. Eve, J.). In Gratzl, a court 
reporter who suffered from urinary incontinence required frequent access to a restroom during work 
hours. See id. at *2. After providing a note from her doctor stating that her medical condition 
required her to be close to a washroom and that she needed to get to a restroom at a moment’s 
notice, the reported asked for assignment to the court’s control room. See id. at *3. Instead, the 
chief judge offered her a rotation that would allow her to work in the five courtrooms that were 
closest to the restrooms. See id. The reporter refused the assignment and filed suit under the ADA
9
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for failure to accommodate. See id. at *4. In granting summary judgment against the reporter, the 
Gratzl Court found that the impairment, urinary incontinence, did not substantially limit the major 
life activity of waste elimination because the reporter’s “inability to eliminate waste is a 
characteristic of her incontinence, and thus is not sufficiently distinct or separate from her 
impairment.” Id. at *8.
Incredibly, Cast claims that Gratzl essentially overturned Erjavac and that “Gratzl is the 
applicable precedent that should be applied.” In Erjavac, another court within this district denied 
the employer’s motion for summary judgment in an ADA discrimination case, finding that a 
reasonable jury could find the employee disabled when the employee’s diabetes required the 
employee to make frequent trips to the restroom immediately upon feeling the urge to urinate. See 
Erjavac., 13 F.Supp.2d at 741, 749. Ignoring that one district court does not have the ability to 
overturn another district court’s ruling, even if Gratzl was controlling authority for this Court, it 
would not be applicable to Ortega’s situation. To determine whether a person has a disability under 
the ADA, a court must evaluate the effect of the individual’s impairment on the individual’s ability 
to perform a major life activity. See Furnish v. SVISys., Inc., 270 F.3d 445, 450 (7th Cir. 2001) 
(requiring analysis of affected life activities rather than characteristics of the impairment). In Gratzl, 
the reporter claimed that her impairment, urinary incontinence, substantially limited her ability to 
eliminate waste. However, the Gratzl Court rejected that claim because the inability to eliminate 
waste is merely a characteristic of incontinence, and not an activity sufficiently distinct or separate 
from the impairment, stating that the argument “that her incontinence, namely, her inability to 
control the bodily function of urinating, limits her ability to control her urination . . . is a circular 
argument at best.” See Gratzl, 2008 WL 2840566, at *8. In contrast, Ortega does not contend that
10
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his impairment is urinary incontinence; rather, he claims that diabetes substantially limits his ability 
to eliminate waste. The characteristics of diabetes include an inability to regulate blood sugar levels. 
See Branham, 392 F.3d at 898 (describing characteristics of diabetes). Although diabetes can cause 
frequent urination, waste elimination is a life activity sufficiently distinct from the blood sugar 
characteristics of diabetes that frequent urination is not a mere characteristic of the impairment in 
the same way that a lack of bladder control is a characteristic of urinary incontinence.
Because a reasonable jury could conclude that diabetes substantially limits Ortega’s ability 
to eliminate waste, the Court cannot find that Ortega is not disabled under the ADA as a matter of 
law. Therefore, the Court must determine whether the undisputed facts show that Cast complied 
with the ADA’s substantive requirements.
I. Failure to Accommodate
The ADA requires that employers make reasonable accommodations for an employee’s 
known disability. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(b)(5)(A), 12112(a). In order to prevail on a failure to 
accommodate claim under the ADA, the employee must show: 1) that he is a qualified individual 
with a disability; 2) that the employer was aware of the disability; and 3) the employer failed to 
reasonably accommodate the disability. See Mobley v. Allstate Ins. Co., 531 F.3d 529, 545 (7th Cir. 
2008). The parties agree that Cast did not provide Ortega with an accommodation for his frequent 
urination.
A “qualified individual with a disability” is “an individual with a disability who, with or 
without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position 
that he holds . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8);Mobley, 531 F.3d at 545. Therefore, an employee with 
a disability who can perform the essential functions of his job and meet his employer’s expectations
11
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is a “qualified individual with a disability” under the ADA. See Hammel v. Eau Galle Cheese 
Factory, 407 F.3d 852, 862 (7th Cir. 2005). Here, the parties have not disputed whether Ortega can 
perform the essential function of his job or whether he has met Cast’s performance expectations. 
Nothing in the record suggests that Ortega cannot perform the essential function of his job, operating 
a die cast machine. Additionally, it is undisputed that Cast never expressed dissatisfaction with 
Ortega’s productivity levels. Therefore, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Ortega, 
Cast has failed to demonstrate that Ortega is not a “qualified individual with a disability” as a matter 
of law.
Under the ADA, the employee seeking accommodation bears the initial duty of providing 
the employer with notice of the disability. See EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 417 F.3d 789, 803­
04 (7th Cir. 2005). In most cases, the employee must inform that employer that he has a disability 
and desires an accommodation. See Jovanovic v. In-Sink-Erator Div. o f Emerson Elec. Co., 201 
F.3d 894, 899 (7th Cir. 2000) (“Although there will be exceptions to the general rule . . . the 
standard rule is that a plaintiff must normally request an accommodation before liability under the 
ADA attaches.”). Informing a direct supervisor of a disability satisfies the employee’s initial duty 
of providing the employer with notice of the disability. See Gile v. United Airlines, Inc., 213 F.3d 
364, 369, 373 (7th Cir. 2000) (finding that employee fulfilled the ADA’s notice requirement when 
she informed her immediate supervisor that she suffered from depression and needed a shift 
transfer). After the employee provides the employer with notice, the employer and the employee 
must engage in an interactive process to evaluate the extent of the disability and the possibility of 
accommodating the disability. See Sears, 417 F.3d at 804.
12
Case: 1:07-cv-05457 Document #: 45 Filed: 03/09/09 Page 13 of 17 PagelD  #:<pageID>
The parties agree that Ortega never informed Haener or anyone else within Cast’s Human 
Resources Department that diabetes caused him to urinate frequently while he was at work. The 
undisputed facts show that he immediately informed Cast that he had diabetes when he learned of 
the diagnosis on July 21, 2003. Additionally, on January 12, 2005, Ortega informed Haener that he 
could not work overtime hours on account of his diabetes. Although he began to experience 
frequent urination as a result of his diabetes in the winter months o f2004, the January 12, 2005 letter 
did not mention frequent urination. The parties agree that Haener did not learn of Ortega’s frequent 
urination until March 9, 2006, the day after Haener terminated Ortega for urinating while on the Cast 
factory floor.
While the parties agree that Haener did not receive notification regarding Ortega’s frequent 
urination before his termination date, Ortega claims that he discussed the condition with Ortiz, his 
direct supervisor. Specifically, Ortega contends that he had three conversations with Ortiz about 
his frequent urination from October 2005 through December 2005. (Def. 56.1 Resp. ^ 16.) He 
claims that he first approached Ortiz to discuss his frequent urination immediately after he 
involuntarily urinated on himself at work while attempting to reach the restroom from his work 
station. (Def. 56.1 Resp. ^ 13.) During that conversation, Ortega informed Ortiz that a very short 
amount of time passes from the time that he first feels the urge to urinate until he cannot control his 
bladder, and that after he first felt the urge, he could not secure his machine and walk to the restroom 
before involuntarily urinating on himself. (Id.) Ortega then explained that he urinated into a cup 
at his workstation whenever he felt that he could not make it to the restroom before losing control 
of his bladder. (Id.) To remedy the situation, Ortega asked Ortiz to move his work station closer 
to the restroom. (Def. 56.1 Resp. ^ 15.) Ortiz refused and told Ortega that he could continue
13
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urinating into the cup at his workstation as long as the “big bosses” did not see him. (Def. 56.1 
Resp. ^ 14.)
Ortiz disagrees with Ortega’s description of their interactions. He denies that he ever had 
a conversation with Ortega regarding frequent urination. (Def. 56.1 Resp. ^  15-17.) Additionally, 
Ortiz claims that he did not even know about Ortega’s frequent urination until he saw him urinate 
near his work station on March 8, 2006. (Def. 56.1 Resp. ^ 17.) Therefore, Ortiz and Ortega dispute 
whether Cast received notice of Ortega’s frequent urination. Because Ortiz served as Ortega’s direct 
supervisor, if  Ortega informed Ortiz that he had difficulty making it to the restrooms at work before 
losing control of his bladder because of the distance between his work station and the restroom, then 
the ADA would have required Cast to explore potential ways to accommodate that problem. 
However, if  Ortiz did not receive notice of Ortega’s frequent urination at work, then Cast would 
have been under no obligation to explore accommodations with Ortega. Therefore, a genuine 
dispute of material fact exists as to whether Cast received notice from Ortega regarding the frequent 
urination that he experienced at work as a result of diabetes. Accordingly, Cast has not shown that 
it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law with respect to Ortega’s claim for failure to 
accommodate his frequent urination.
II. Discriminatory Discharge
The ADA prohibits employers from “discriminating] against a qualified individual with a 
disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to . . . discharge of employees . . . .” 
42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). An employment decision is “because of the disability” when the plaintiff’ s 
disability was a motivating factor behind the decision. See Foster v. Arthur Andersen, LLP, 168 
F.3d 1029, 1033 (7th Cir. 1999). Therefore, for an employer to be liable under the ADA for
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discriminatory discharge, the disability must be “the catalyst which prompted the employer to take 
the adverse employment action, and a factor without which the employer would not have acted.” 
Id. at 1034. Of course, in order for a disability to be a motivating factor behind the decision to 
terminate an employee, the decision maker must have knowledge of the disability. See Hedberg v. 
Ind. Bell Tel. Co., Inc., 47 F.3d 928, 932 (7th Cir. 1995) (“If it does not know of the disability, the 
employer is firing the employee ‘because o f  some other reason.”)
Here, the undisputed facts show that Haener did not learn that diabetes caused Ortega to 
frequently urinate until March 9, 2006, the day after she terminated him for urinating while he was 
on Cast’s factory floor. Because Haener did not know of Ortega’s disability on March 8, 2006 when 
she fired him, she could not have fired him because of his disability.
Despite the fact that Haener did not know of Ortega’s disability when she fired him, the 
EEOC contends that Ortiz held a discriminatory animus towards Ortega that should be imputed to 
Haener’s termination decision. To demonstrate a causal connection between membership in a 
protected class and an adverse employment action, the plaintiff “must provide direct or 
circumstantial evidence that the decision maker has acted for a prohibited reason.” Rogers v. City 
o f Chicago, 320 F.3d 748, 754 (7th Cir. 2003) (emphasis in original). Nonetheless, courts impute 
the discriminatory animus of a subordinate employee to the decision maker when the subordinate 
employee possesses so much influence that he essentially transforms himself into the functional 
decision maker or when the subordinate employee supplies misinformation to the decision maker. 
See Brewer v. Bd. ofTrs. ofthe Univ. o f Ill., 479 F.3d 908, 917-18 (7th Cir. 2007). However, when 
the employer’s “ultimate decision is clearly made on an independent and a legally permissive basis, 
the bias of the subordinate is not relevant.” Willis v. Marion County Auditor’s Office, 118 F.3d 542,
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547 (7th Cir. 1997); see also Brewer, 479 F.3d at 918 (“[A]n independent investigation absolves the 
employer of liability.”).
As discussed previously, a dispute exists regarding whether Ortiz had knowledge that 
diabetes caused Ortega to urinate frequently. If Ortiz did not know, then he could not have held 
discriminatory animus towards Ortega on the basis of Ortega’s disability. If Ortiz did know, then 
it is possible that he held discriminatory animus towards Ortega; however, no evidence in the record 
suggests that Ortiz fostered such an animus towards Ortega. Ortega concedes that no Cast employee 
ever expressed discriminatory sentiments towards him regarding his disability and that no one at 
Cast exposed him to ridicule or humiliation regarding his need to urinate frequently. (Pl. 56.1 Resp. 
^ 36.) Therefore, even if Ortiz had knowledge of Ortega’s disability, the record contains no 
evidence that would permit the inference that Ortiz harbored a discriminatory animus towards 
Ortega on the basis of his disability that the Court could impute to Cast.
Furthermore, even if Ortiz held a discriminatory animus towards Ortega on the basis of his 
disability, the undisputed facts show that Haener did not rely exclusively upon Ortiz’s version of the 
events in making her decision to terminate Ortega. Haener held a meeting with Ortega to discuss 
the events of March 8, 2006 on the Cast factory floor. During that meeting, Haener asked Ortega 
whether he urinated near his work station instead of in a restroom. Ortega responded by admitting 
that he urinated near his work station. Accordingly, even if Ortiz held a discriminatory animus 
towards Ortega, it would be inappropriate to impute that animus to Haener because she made an 
independent inquiry to determine that Ortega had urinated near his work station. After Ortega 
admitted that he had urinated while he was near his work station, Haener terminated his employment 
because he had exposed his penis and urinated while he was on Cast’s factory floor. Therefore,
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Haener arrived at her ultimate decision to terminate Ortega independent of any bias that Ortiz held 
against Ortega because of his disability. Because an independent investigation absolves the 
employer of a subordinate’s discriminatory animus, even if Ortiz held a discriminatory animus 
towards Ortega, that animus would not be imputed to Cast. Therefore, the undisputed facts show 
that Cast is entitled to judgment as a matter of law with respect to the claim for discriminatory 
discharge.
CONCLUSION AND ORDER
For the reasons stated, Cast’s Motion for Summary Judgment is granted in part and denied 
in part. With respect to the claim for failure to accommodate Ortega’s disability, the motion is 
denied. With respect to the claim for discriminatory discharge, the motion is granted.
So ordered.
Date: March 9, 2009
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